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Abstract− A general approach to real-time transient stability 
control is described, yielding various complementary techniques: 
pure preventive, open loop emergency, and closed loop 
emergency controls. The organization of the resulting control 
schemes is then revisited in order to make it able to cover static 
and voltage security, in addition to transient stability. Distinct 
approaches for preventive and emergency operating conditions 
are advocated.   
 
Index Terms− Transient stability, preventive control, 
emergency control, OPF, integrated security control. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Power system security is more and more in conflict with 
economic and environmental requirements. Security control 
aims at making decisions in different time horizons so as to 
prevent the system from undesired situations, and in particular 
to avoid large catastrophic outages.  Traditionally, security 
control has been divided in two main categories: preventive 
and emergency control. 
In preventive security control, the objective is to prepare the 
system when it is still in normal operation, so as to make it 
able to face future (uncertain) events in a satisfactory way. In 
emergency control, the disturbing events have already 
occurred, and thus the objective becomes to control the 
dynamics of the system in such a way that consequences are 
minimized. 
Preventive and emergency controls differ in many respects, 
among which we list the following [1]:  
Types of control actions: generation rescheduling, network 
switching reactive compensation, sometimes load curtailment 
for preventive control; direct or indirect load shedding, 
generation shedding, shunt capacitor or reactor switching, 
network splitting for emergency control. 
Uncertainty: in preventive control, the state of the system is 
well known but disturbances are uncertain; in emergency 
control, the disturbance is certain, but the state of the system 
is often only partially known; in both cases, dynamic behavior 
is uncertain. 
Open versus closed loop: preventive control is generally of 
the open loop feed-forward type; emergency control may be 
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closed loop, and hence more robust with respect to 
uncertainties. 
In the past, many utilities have relied on preventive control in 
order to maintain system security at an acceptable level. In 
other words, while there are many emergency control schemes 
installed in reality, the objective has been to prevent these 
schemes as much as possible from operating, by imposing 
rather high objectives to preventive security control. As to any 
rule, there are exceptions: for example controlled generation 
shedding has been used extensively in North America to 
handle transient stability problems; in the same way, 
corrective control has been used in many systems as an 
alternative to preventive control in the context of thermal 
overload mitigation.  
Nowadays, where the pressure is to increase trading and 
competition in the power system field, preventive security 
control is being considered as an impediment to competition; 
in turn, this breeds strong incentives to resort less on 
preventive control and more often on emergency control. 
The objective of this paper is essentially twofold: first, to 
concentrate on transient stability control, both preventive and 
emergency, and describe a general methodology able to 
realize convenient tradeoffs between these two aspects; 
second, to suggest means of integrated security control, 
coordinating various types of security (static security, voltage 
and transient stability). 
2 EMERGING TRANSIENT STABILITY CONTROL TECHNIQUES 
Various generation rescheduling control techniques have 
recently been proposed, based on the general transient 
stability method called SIME [2]. This section describes three 
such techniques dealing respectively with preventive control, 
closed-loop emergency control, and open loop emergency 
control; this latter technique aims at mitigating control actions 
taken preventively with emergency actions triggered only after 
the threatening event has actually occurred.  
In what follows, we briefly describe the basic SIME method, 
and then concentrate on the advocated control techniques. 
2.1 SIME in Brief 
2.1.1 Description 
SIME (for SIngle-Machine Equivalent), is a hybrid direct− 
temporal method.  
Basically, SIME replaces the dynamics of the multi-machine 
power system by that of a suitable One-Machine Infinite Bus 
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(OMIB) system. By refreshing continuously the OMIB 
parameters and by assessing the OMIB stability via the equal-
area criterion, SIME provides an as accurate transient stability 
assessment as the one provided by the multi-machine 
temporal information and, in addition, stability margins and 
critical machines. In other words, SIME preserves the features 
of the temporal description (flexibility with respect to power 
system modeling, accuracy of transient stability assessment, 
handling of any type of instability- first- or multi-swing, plant 
or inter-area mode), and, in addition, complements them with 
functionalities of paramount importance. One of them is the 
generation rescheduling based on the knowledge of stability 
margins and critical machines. Indeed, the amount of 
generation to shift depends on the size of the stability margin, 
and the generators from which to shift it are the so-called 
critical machines. 
Depending upon whether the temporal information is 
provided by a Time-Domain (T-D) simulation program or by 
real-time measurements, the above methodology yields the 
“preventive” or the “emergency” SIME. 
2.1.2 Preventive SIME  
In short, the “preventive” SIME analyzes an unstable case by 
driving a T-D program as soon as the system enters its post-
fault configuration. At each step of the T-D simulation, SIME 
transforms the multi-machine system furnished by this 
program into a suitable One-Machine Infinite Bus (OMIB) 
equivalent, defined by its angle δ , speed ω , mechanical 
power mP , electrical power eP  and inertia coefficient M. (All 
OMIB parameters are derived from multi-machine system 
parameters and are therefore time-varying.) Further, SIME 
explores the OMIB dynamics by using the Equal-Area 
Criterion (EAC). The procedure stops as soon as the OMIB 
reaches the EAC instability conditions assessed by the 
closed-form expressions 
( ) 0=ua tP     ;    ( ) 0>ua tP&       (1) 
 
where, Pa is the OMIB accelerating power, difference between 
Pm and Pe, and tu is the time to instability: at this time the 
OMIB system loses synchronism, and the system machines 
split irrevocably into two groups: the group of “advanced 
machines” that are henceforth referred to as the “critical 
machines” (CMs), and the remaining ones, called the “non- 
critical machines”, (NMs)1. Thus, at tu SIME determines: 
the CMs, responsible of the system loss of synchronism, and 





uaccdecu MAA ωη −=−=   .      (2) 
Similar expressions are derived also for stable cases.  
2.1.3 Emergency SIME (E-SIME) 
Following a disturbance inception and its clearance, E-SIME 
aims at predicting the system transient stability behavior and, 
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 The “advanced machines” are the CMs for up-swing instability phenomena, 
while for back-swing phenomena they become NMs.  
if necessary, at deciding and triggering control actions early 
enough to prevent loss of synchronism. Further, it aims at 
continuing monitoring the system, in order to assess whether 
the control action has been sufficient or should be reinforced. 
The method relies on real-time measurements, rather than 
information provided by time-domain simulation. This is 
discussed below, in §2.4. 
2.2 Principle of SIME-based transient stability control 
To stabilize an unstable case, SIME uses the size of 
instability (margin), the critical machines, and suggestions 
for stabilization. These suggestions are obtained by the 
interplay between OMIB–EAC (Equal-Area Criterion) and 
time-domain multi-machine representations, according to the 
following reasoning: stabilizing an unstable case consists of 
modifying the pre-or post-contingency conditions until the 
stability margin becomes zero. According to EAC, this 
implies increasing the decelerating area and/or decreasing the 
accelerating area of the OMIB δ-P  representation. In turn, 
this may be achieved by decreasing the OMIB equivalent 
generation power. The amount of the OMIB generation 
decrease, ∆POMIB , is directly related to the margin  η [2], [3]:  
 η = f(∆POMIB.).         (3) 
2.3 Preventive Control 
2.3.1 Iterative stabilization procedure 
It is shown that to keep the total consumption constant, the 
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 (4)  
where ∆PC and ∆PN  are the changes in the total power of the 
group of critical and non-critical machines, respectively.  
Application of eqs (3) and (4) provides a first approximate 
value of ∆PC that may be refined via a stabilization procedure, 
which is iterative since the margin variation with stability 
conditions is not perfectly linear. Nevertheless, in practice, 
the number of required iterations (margins) seldom exceeds 3 
[3], [4]. 
2.3.2 Generation rescheduling patterns 
Expression (4) suggests that there exist numerous patterns for 
distributing the total power change ∆PN among non-critical 
machines, and whenever there are many critical machines, 
numerous patterns for distributing the total ∆PC as well. The 
choice among various patterns may be dictated by various 
objectives, related to market or technical considerations.  
In the absence of particular constraints or objectives, the total 
generation power could be distributed proportionally to the 
inertias of the machines. A more interesting solution consists 
of using an optimal power flow (OPF) program, as discussed 
below. 
Finally, the above procedure may readily be adjusted for 
stabilizing many harmful contingencies simultaneously.   
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2.3.3 Transient stability-constrained OPF 
The Optimal Power Flow (OPF) uses control variables like 
active and reactive generation powers to achieve a good 
tradeoff between security and economics. More specifically, 
this program optimizes the power system operating condition 
with respect to a pre-specified objective (minimum operating 
cost, maximum power flow), while respecting generator limits 
and static security constraints (line power flows and bus 
voltage limits). 
Several attempts have been made to imbed transient stability 
constraints within the OPF. According to the way of handling 
these constraints, they yielded two different approaches that 
below we call “global” and “sequential”. 
Global approach. A time-domain (T-D) simulation is run. 
The power system transient stability model is converted into 
an algebraic set of equations for each time step of this 
simulation. The set of non-linear algebraic equations resulting 
from the whole T-D simulation is then included in the OPF as 
a stability constraint, forming a (generally huge) single non-
linear programming problem (e.g., see [5], [6]). 
Sequential approach. A T-D simulation is run. The transient 
stability constraints are directly converted into conventional 
constraints of a standard OPF program, e.g., active generation 
power. Hence, they do not affect the size of the power system 
model and the complexity of the OPF solution method. They 
can use any conventional OPF program. 
Conceptually, the global approach is more appealing: it is 
supposed to handle the problem as a whole and, hence, to 
provide an optimal solution, which would be accepted as the 
reference by the system operator and the electric market 
participants. However, its practical feasibility has not yet been 
proven and it also raises a few objections: it lacks 
transparency about the salient parameters responsible for the 
system loss of synchronism, and the reasons underlying the 
advocated solution; it does not propose alternative solutions; 
it requires heavy computations due to the huge programming 
model; it generally uses simplified power system modeling in 
order to make the whole procedure compatible with 
acceptable computing requirements. Further, in very stressed 
systems where modeling details are necessary for assessing 
correctly power system limits, convergence problems can also 
arise because the additional constraints, modeled as a large set 
of algebraic equations, may be ill conditioned. Finally, 
increasing the number of constraints treated by the global 
function might result in overly conservative stability 
assessment.  
As concerning the sequential approach, the main objection is 
that it cannot guarantee optimality. 
In principle, the SIME-based transient stability-constrained 
techniques may comply with either of the above approaches. 
Figure 1 illustrates the use of the sequential approach, which, 
besides the above-mentioned advantages, may easily comply 
with market requirements thanks to the flexibility of choice 
among CMs and NMs on which generation can be re-
dispatched. 
2.4 Closed-loop emergency control 
Closed-loop emergency control relies on the “Emergency 
SIME”, which was shortly mentioned in § 2.1.3.  
The principle of the control technique remains the same with 
the preventive SIME, but its application has the following 
important differences ([2], [7], [8], [9]). 
• The information about the multi-machine system is provided 
by real-time measurements rather than T-D simulations. 
• The generation shift from critical machines is made here by 
shedding generation that is not compensated by a generation 
increase on non-critical machines (at least at the very first 
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Fig. 1. Transient stability-constrained OPF (sequential approach) 
 
 
• The system status (unstable margin and critical machines) is 
predicted rather than assessed along the system transient 
trajectory.  
The resulting practical procedure is summarized below. 
2.4.1 Predictive transient stability assessment 
The prediction relies on real-time phasor measurements, 
acquired at regular time steps, it ’s, and refreshed at the rate 
it∆ . The procedure consists of the following steps. 
(i) Predicting the OMIB structure: use a Taylor series 
expansion to predict (say, 100 ms ahead), the individual 
machines’ rotor angles; rank the machines according to their 
angles, identify the largest angular distance between two 
successive machines and declare those above this distance to 
be the “candidate critical machines”, the remaining ones being 
the “candidate non-critical machines”. The suitable 
aggregation of these machines provides the “candidate 
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OMIB”. 
(ii) Predicting the δ−aP  curve: compute the parameters of 
this “candidate OMIB”, and in particular its accelerating 
power and rotor angle, aP  and δ , using three successive data 
sets acquired for the three different times.  
(iii) Predicting instability: to determine whether the OMIB 
reaches the unstable conditions (1). 
If not, repeat steps (i) to (iii) using new measurements sets. 
If yes, the candidate OMIB is the critical one, for which the 
method computes successively the unstable angle uδ , the 
corresponding time to instability, tu , and the unstable margin 
expressed by (2). 
 (iv) Validity test. Observing that under given stability 
conditions, the value of the (negative) margin should be 
constant, whatever the time step, provides a handy validity 
test: it consists of pursuing the above computations until 
reaching an (almost) constant margin value. 
 
2.4.2 Salient features 
The method aims at controlling the system in less than, say, 
500 ms after the contingency inception and its clearance.  
The prediction phase starts after detecting an anomaly 
(contingency occurrence) and its clearance by means of 
protective relays or phasor measurements. Note that this 
prediction does not imply identification of the contingency 
(location, type, etc.).  
The prediction is possible thanks to the use of the OMIB 
transformation; predicting the behavior (accelerating power) 
of all of the system machines would leads to unreliable 
results.  
There may be a tradeoff between the above mentioned 
validation test and time to instability: the shorter this time, the 
earlier the corrective action should be taken, possibly before 
complete convergence of the validation test. 
2.4.3  Structure of the emergency control scheme 
The method pursues the following main objectives: 
• to assess whether the system is stable or it is driven to 
instability; in the latter case 
• to assess “how much” unstable the system is going to be; 
accordingly, 
• to assess “where” and “how much corrective action” to take 
(pre-assigned type of corrective action); 
• to continue assessing whether the executed corrective action 
has been sufficient or whether to proceed further. 
Block 2 of Fig. 2 covers the two first steps: prediction of 
instability, and of its size and critical machines. Block 3 takes 
care of the control actions i.e., of determining the number of 
generators to shed. Note that when the order of triggering the 
action has been sent, the method continues monitoring and 
controlling the system in a closed-loop fashion, until getting 
stabilization. 
2.4.4 Discussion 
The prediction of the time to (reach) instability may influence 
the control decision (size of control; time to trigger it; etc). 
The hardware requirements of the emergency control scheme 
are phasor measurement devices placed at the main power 
plant stations and communication systems to transmit 
(centralize-decentralize) this information. These requirements 
seem to be within reach of today’s technology [10]. 
The control is free from uncertainties about power system 
modeling, parameter values, operating condition, type and 
location of the contingency, since it relies on a (relatively 
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Fig. 2. Closed-loop transient stability emergency control:  general framework 
 
2.5 Open loop emergency control (OLEC) 
This technique is a mixture of the preceding two techniques: 
from a methodological viewpoint, it is event driven and relies 
on transient stability simulations, like the preventive control 
technique, described in § 2.3; but its application uses 
generation tripping, like the emergency control technique.  
The leading idea is to mitigate preventive actions (generation 
shifting) by complementing them with emergency actions 
(generation shedding) that would automatically be triggered 
only if the postulated contingency actually occurs. The 
technique relies on the assumption that (some of) the critical 
machines belong to a power plant equipped with a generation 
tripping scheme; therefore a certain number of units could be 
tripped in the emergency mode. 
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A detailed description of the technique and its variants may be 
found in [3], [4]. In short, it uses the preventive simulation 
procedure of §2.3, where, however, a variety of generation 
tripping patterns (including the delay of generation tripping 
and the number of critical machines to trip) are successively 
simulated, in order to get an operating condition that realizes 
a good compromise between security and economics. After 
the “optimal” number of machines to trip is determined, the 
settings of the special protection activating the generation 
tripping scheme in the plant is adapted so as to automatically 
disconnect these machines in the event of the contingency 
occurrence. 
3. DISCUSSION 
3.1 A pragmatic approach to integrated security control 
3.1.1 Preventive mode security control 
The main objective is to incorporate into a single decision 
support tool for on-line operation security criteria that ensure 
at the same time static and dynamic security with respect to a 
list of potentially harmful contingencies identified during the 
analysis stage. We propose to use the optimal power flow 
formulation as a generic approach to handle this problem.  
More specifically, let CL-SS be a list of potentially harmful 
contingencies from the viewpoint of static security, CL-TS a 
list of such contingencies from the viewpoint of transient 
stability and CL-VS a list of potentially harmful contingencies 
from the viewpoint of voltage stability. Then, we can 
formulate an optimization problem incorporating the 
following constraints: 
1. normal mode (i.e. preventive mode) power flow equations, 
equality and inequality constraints (voltage magnitudes in 
normal range and branch flows below permanent limit) 
2. for each element in CL-SS a set of post-contingency power 
flow equations, equality and inequality constraints (voltage 
magnitudes in emergency range and branch flows below 
emergency state limit) 
3. for each element in CL-TS a constraint on the total normal 
mode generation of the corresponding set of critical 
generators (e.g. derived by the preventive SIME method) 
4. for each element in CL-VS one (or several) constraints on 
the normal mode active and reactive power injections 
sufficiently strong to ensure voltage stability with respect to 
that contingency (e.g. see [11] and [12] for such an approach).  
 
For a given objective function (e.g. minimal deviation, 
minimal cost of reschedule), the resolution of such an optimal 
power flow problem can be handled by a conventional 
security constrained OPF. As long as the number of elements 
of CL-SS remains small, the CPU time required by a single 
run of such a tool is normally compatible with on-line 
requirements. Nevertheless, there is (obviously) no guarantee 
that the resulting rescheduled operating point exists 
(feasibility) and is simultaneously secure with respect to all 
three phenomena. Thus, in principle, it would be necessary to 
iterate the above resolution scheme according to the same 
principle as the one given in Figure 1, when handling security 
constraints only related to transient stability. And (obviously) 
there is also no guarantee that such an iterative process would 
eventually converge (in a reasonable number of iterations), 
and if yes, that the resulting new operating point would indeed 
be optimal.  
We notice that the approach proposed relies on the availability 
of DSA tools able to express approximations to dynamic 
security regions in terms of pre-contingency parameters. The 
more accurate these approximations the better the resulting 
optimization. In particular, we believe that the proposed 
scheme is reasonable when combined with methods such as 
SIME and an appropriate VSA method.  
3.1.2 Emergency mode security control 
While in preventive mode it is necessary to combine into a 
single coherent decision making strategy the handling of all 
security constraints (because they may be conflicting), in 
emergency mode security control one can generally take 
advantage of the temporal decoupling of the different 
phenomena, since thermal problems are typically significantly 
slower than voltage collapses which in turn are typically much 
slower than loss of synchronism. Hence, the different 
emergency control schemes can operate independently from 
each other.  
3.2 Limitations and further research needs 
3.2.1 Arbitration between preventive and emergency control 
A first limitation of the preceding approach is that it is not 
able to arbitrate between preventive and emergency control. 
More precisely the approach supposes that the contingencies 
and phenomena that must be treated in a preventive way are 
given a priori. However, from a rational point of view the fact 
that a certain security problem (or constraint) should be 
treated in preventive or in emergency mode actually depends 
on operating conditions (both electrical, economic, and 
meteorological). For example, if a certain harmful 
contingency becomes very likely (e.g. because of changing 
weather conditions), or if the cost of treating in preventive 
mode is negligible (e.g. because there is cheap load 
curtailment), then it makes probably more sense to handle it in 
preventive mode than in emergency mode. Thus, in principle 
the arbitration between preventive and emergency mode 
security control should be an output of (and not an input to) 
the security control decision support tools. However, there are 
intrinsic difficulties in achieving this objective mainly because 
of lack of data on probabilities of contingencies (as a function 
of on-line conditions) and difficulties to model the costs of 
interruptions, both of which would be required to allow for 
the simultaneous treatment of preventive and emergency 
mode security [1][13].  
3.2.2 New control devices 
New control devices such as variable series compensation, as 
well as more systematic use of interruptible load, can 
potentially make it easier to handle security in on-line 
operation. However, the analytical methods developed today, 
like SIME, VSA etc, do not take into account these 
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possibilities. Thus, further research is needed in order to 
develop tools able to suggest how to use such devices. 
3.2.3 Uncertainties 
A major problem in large-scale systems is that of real-time 
information concerning the status of neighbor systems and the 
incorporation of this information into appropriate dynamic 
equivalents needed to carry out meaningful simulations and 
DSA computations in real-time. The unavailability of this 
information translates into modeling uncertainties, which 
should be taken into account in a conservative way. Here also, 
research and developments are necessary in order to reduce 
the amount of arbitrariness of security control [14]. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This paper has pursued a twofold objective.  
On the one hand, it has addressed the issue of real-time 
transient stability control, which has long been considered to 
be extremely problematic if at all feasible. Three different 
schemes have been advocated, able to encounter a variety of 
specific needs, depending on power systems specifics. It was 
shown that preventive control and its variant, the open loop 
emergency control, are mature enough and ready for 
implementation. Closed loop emergency control, on the other 
hand, is very much dependent on today’s high tech; its 
implementation might therefore require further adjustments 
and strong incentives. 
The second objective was an attempt towards integrated 
security control techniques, able to cover dynamic and static 
security aspects. It appeared that the software tools available 
today are able to achieve such integrated approaches. 
Nevertheless, while from a theoretical viewpoint the above-
advocated approaches are within reach, their realization 
depends on information about the system configuration, 
including generation status that the liberalized electricity 
markets seem reluctant to provide. And although such issues 
have not been addressed in this paper, these authors feel that 
blackouts will continue threatening the power systems, unless 
such information is made available, under the pressure of 
regulatory bodies in the States, Europe, and other continents.  
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